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INTERPLEADER IN VIRGINIA
I. HISTORY
Interpleader is a joinder device employed by a stakeholder (as the obligor
is called) who does not know to which of several claimants he is or may be
liable. It allows him to bring all of the claimants into a single proceeding,
and to require them to litigate among themselves to determine who, if any,
has a valid claim to the stake.)
Although interpleader originated as a common law device whereby a
defendant, in a limited number of circumstances, could protect himself
from double vexation upon a single liability, it soon became an equitable
rather than legal procedure.2 Interpleader had tremendous potential as a
device of judicial economy. Not only did it enable the stakeholder to avoid
the expense of defending against several vexing claims in separate suits
and the hardship of potentially inconsistent results arising therefrom, but
also it afforded the court a simple method of avoiding two suits where one
would suffice. However, this potential was soon thwarted by technical
requirements of somewhat questionable historical authority and limited
policy justifications.3 The unfortunate result was often a denial of the
remedy in the situation where it would have worked so well. The classic
statement of these restrictive rules, and the usual starting point for any
discussion of interpleader, is that of Pomeroy:
[F]rom the whole of authorities, it is clear that the equitable remedy of
interpleader, independent of recent statutory regulations, depends upon and
requires the existence of the four following elements, which may be regarded
as essential conditions:
1. The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all of the
parties against whom relief is demanded [identity of claims];
2. All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent upon or be
derived from a common source [privity or common or origin];
3. The person asking the relief-the plaintiff-must not have or claim
any interest in the subject-matter [disinterestedness];
4. He must have incurred no independent liability to either of the
claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them,
in the position merely of a stakeholder [no independent liability].'
The Virginia Supreme Court endorsed Pomeroy's "essential conditions"
1. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 74 (3rd ed. 1976).
2. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L. J. 814 (1921) [hereinafter cited as
Chafee]; Rogers, Historical Origins of Interpleader, 51 YALE L. J. 925 (1942).
3. See Hazard and Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52
CALIF. L. REv. 706 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hazard and Moskovitz].
4. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1322 (5th ed. 1941).
331
332 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:331
for a bill of interpleader ("strict" or "pure" interpleader as it has come to
be called) in the case of Runkle v. Runkle.5 In that case Mr. Runkle had
predeceased Mrs. Runkle. On her death bed, Mrs. Runkle gave money to
her sister to hold for safekeeping. After Mrs. Runkle's death, the sister had
a clerk of a bank count and deposit the funds as received from Mrs. Run-
kle's estate through her sister. A dispute ensued between the administra-
tors of each decedent's estate with both claiming the fund held by the bank
as property of his decedent. The bank, faced with the two adverse claims,
sought to interplead both claimants. The Virginia Supreme Court held, in
reversing the trial court, that interpleader should be denied. First, the
claims were not dependent upon a common origin, the one deriving title
from the husband, the other from his wife. Secondly, the bank had in-
curred independent liability either as the debtor to or bailee of Mrs. Run-
kle's estate when it undertook to hold the fund for that estate. It is difficult
to find a case where interpleader was more appropriate,6 and yet denied
because of the restrictive requirements which the equity courts had come
to associate with such a beneficial remedy.
In part, at least, as a reaction to the very strict requirements of pure
interpleader, the bill in the nature of interpleader was created by the
equity courts.' The only material difference between strict interpleader
and a bill in the nature of interpleader is that the latter allowed the appli-
cant to be an active claimanit asserting claims, not merely a disinterested
stakeholder.' Thus, the stakeholder could deny liability in whole or in part
5. 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
6. Again, in Bell Storage Co. v. Harrison, 164 Va. 278, 180 S.E. 320 (1935), the Virginia
Supreme Court, following the Runkle case, reached an unsatisfactory result because of the
court's strict adherance to the essential elements of pure interpleader. The bill of interpleader
was denied for the following three reasons: first, the claims of defendants were not dependent
upon or derived from a common source, one claiming the goods as her own while the creditors
claimed that the goods belonged to her husband; second, the stakeholder had incurred inde-
pendent liability to one claimant by wrongfully selling the goods after they were placed in
his possession as bailee; and finally, because the stakeholder could not be wholly indifferent
if he had incurred independent liability to one claimant.
7. Beckman, Interpleader, 16 U. CIN. L. REv. 117, 163 (1942).
8. MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lusby, 295 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1969). It was the general rule
that a bill in the nature of interpleader would not lie unless supported by some special ground
for equitable relief other than the fear of multiple vexation. 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE,
22.07, at 22-47 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 3A MOORE]. However, the rule was appar-
ently "more honored in the breach than the observance .... Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 479 (E.D. La. 1960). This is probably because there had to be some
equitable basis for bringing even a strict interpleader action or there would be no equity
jurisdiction at all, and the stakeholder's remedy would be at law. See John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938); 3A MOORE, supra. Thus, the federal courts
no longer make any distinction between the two remedies, and it is a sufficient equitable basis
for interpleader actions brought by either interested or disinterested stakeholders if there is
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to any or all of the claimants, as well as assert an adverse claim to the fund
or property. An early Virginia case9 allowed a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader to stand, but unfortunately, it did not discuss this interpleader
hybrid, or the rationale behind its decision.'0
As a further effort to ameliorate the equitable remedy of interpleader
and to eliminate the technical and restrictive nature of the action which
had destroyed much of its flexibility, the remedy was subjected to statu-
tory modification." Virginia, likewise, adopted a statutory interpleader
provision,'2 but it did not affect, and was merely ancillary to, the equitable
remedy.'" The statutory remedy was limited to a defendant in any action
in which he was a disinterested stakeholder, and was ready to pay or
dispose of the subject matter of the suit as the court directed. Also, the
defendant was required to submit an affidavit that he had not colluded
with any of the claimants. Unfortunately, the early ancillary statutory
a fear of multiple vexation on account of adverse claims. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939);
Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960). See also note 35 infra.
9. First Nat'l. Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 695 (1880). In this case a party
with a security interest in the property of the debtor was entitled to interplead the debtor
and a lien creditor who had levied on the same property to ascertain and establish his own
rights thereto.
10. While there is no definitive reason for the infrequency of reported Virginia cases involv-
ing bills in the nature of interpleader, apparently the elimination of just one of the essential
elements of strict interpleader was insufficient to make it a very useful joinder device in
Virginia. Moreover, the sparce number of Virginia cases dealing with the equitable remedy
of interpleader in general is a reflection of the effect the restrictive requirements for the
remedy had on its utility. See generally 10B MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Interpleader §§1-13
(Repl. Vol. 1977).
11. See Chafee, supra note 2.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-226 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (originally enacted as VA. CODE ch. 152, §1
(1849), as it was taken from the English statute 1 & 2 Will. IV., ch. 58; repealed 1977). This
early ancillary statutory interpleader at law provision read as follows:
Upon affidavit of a defendant in any action that he claims no interest in the subject
matter of the action, but that some third party has a claim thereto, and that he does
not collude with such third party, but is ready to pay or dispose of the subject matter
of the action as the court may direct, the court may make an order requiring such third
party to appear and state the nature of his claim, and maintain or relinquish it, and
in the meantime stay the proceedings in such action. If such third party, on being
served with such order, shall not appear, the court may, on proof of the plaintiff's right,
render judgment for him, and declare such third party to be forever barred of any claim
in respect of the subject matter, either against the plaintiff or the original defendant,
or his personal representative. If such third party, on being so served, shall appear,
the court shall allow him to make himself defendant in the action, and, either in said
action or otherwise, cause such issue or issues to be tried as it may prescribe, and may
direct which party shall be considered the plaintiff in the issues, and shall give judg-
ment upon the verdict rendered on such trial, or, if a jury be waived by the parties
interested, shall determine their claims in a summary way.
13. Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
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interpleader at law provision provided little improvement due to the
court's rigid interpretation of the statute. In Nicholas v. Harrisonburg
Building and Supply Co., 14 the Virginia Supreme Court held that the stat-
ute impliedly required that claims be derived from a common source,' 5 and
that there be no independent liability to any of the claimants. 6 If there
was independent liability present, the stakeholder, it was argued, could
not be disinterested in the outcome of the case as required by the statute.
Although the statute did occassionally provide for a satisfactory result, 7
because of the equity court's influence on the legal remedy as evidenced
by the Nicholas decision and the narrow scope of the statute, interpleader
was still of little benefit as an equitable remedy or as a joinder device in
Virginia.
As a response to the criticism of the equitable remedy and of the early
ancillary statutory interpleader at law provision, the Virginia legislature
has adopted a modern interpleader practice designed to give Virginia ".
14. 181 Va. 207, 24 S.E.2d 452 (1943). This case involved a claim at law by a materialman
against the owners of the building based on an implied guaranty by the owners that they
would retain from the amount due the contractor a sum sufficient to pay the materialman,
and five other claims by mechanics' lienors against the building, which claims were only
enforceable in a court of equity.
15. The early ancillary statutory interpleader at law provision did not require that claims
be derived from a common source or be in privity. See § 8-226, supra note 12. However, the
court, in Nicholas v. Harrisonburg Building and Supply, 181 Va. 207, 2.4 S.E.2d 452 (1943),
dismissed the mechanics' lienors from the interpleader action because their claims were not
personal against the owners and were only enforceable in a court of equity?, whereas the claim
asserted by the materialman was a personal demand enforceable at law. Thus, the claims
had to be in privity for a statutory interpleader action to lie.
16. The early statutory provision also did not require that there be no independent liabil-
ity. See § 8-226, supra note 12. However, the court in Nicholas, supra note 14, justified the
denial of interpleader to the owners of the building by stating that the ovrners were ". . . not
mere stakeholders of the fund, for the reason that, by agreement, they guaranteed the debt
of [the materialman]. If [the owners] had not signed the supplemental contract, the
[materialman] and other mechanics' lien creditors would have stood on the same plane."
Id., at 454. Thus, but for the agreement (and the lack of privity, supra note 15), the owners
could have interpleaded the claimants in a single suit to determine which had the valid claim,
in whole or in part, to the stake. As it happened, the owners would be required to suffer a
second suit by the mechanics' lienors to determine if any part of the judgment paid to the
materialman was, in fact, owing to the mechanics' lien creditors.
17. See, e.g., Parks v. Wiltbank, 177 Va. 461, 14 S.E.2d 281 (1941); Leftwich v. Wells, 101
Va. 255, 43 S.E. 364 (1903). Parks involved a suit to distrain property, in which the defendant
filed an affidavit in accordance with the statute, admitting that he owed rent, but alleging
that another person also claimed the rent, both claimants claiming under the same grantor.
The court, allowing the parties to be interpleaded, ordered the second claimant to appear and
state the nature of his claim. In Leftwich the stakeholder of the decedent's benefit certificate
was allowed to interplead two rival claimants, each claiming to be decedent's beneficiary, the
one by the express language of the certificate, and the other by an alleged assignment.
334 [Vol. 13:331
INTERPLEADER IN VIRGINIA
a comprehensive interpleader remedy . . . in keeping with the modern
trend in the vast majority of American jurisdictions . . ."" The current
Virginia statutory provision reads as follows:
A. Whenever any person is or may be exposed to multiple liability through
the existence of claims by others to the same property or fund held by him
or on his behalf, such person may file a pleading and require such parties to
interplead their claims. It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the
claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do
not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and indepen-
dent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole
or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant in an action who is
exposed to similar liability may likewise obtain such interpleader. The provi-
sions of this rule supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of
parties permitted in § 8.01-5.
B. The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no way supersedes
or limits the remedy provided by any other section of this Code.
C. In any action of interpleader, the court may enter its order restraining
all claimants from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any court of
the Commonwealth affecting the property involved in the interpleader action
until further order of the court.
Such court shall hear and determine the case and may discharge the appro-
priate party from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make
all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.
D. A person interpleading may voluntarily pay or tender into court the
property claimed, or may be ordered to do so by the court; and the court may
thereupon order such party discharged from all or part of any liability as
between the claimants of such property."
The statute does not expressly abolish the equitable remedy, but as a
practical matter, it will supersede the equity procedure "because of the
greater availability, simplicity, and completeness of the remedy which the
statute affords.""0 Furthermore, the new statute is not intended to be sup-
plemental, or ancillary, to the equitable remedy.21
18. VA. CODE CoMM'N. REPORT, REVISION OF TITLE 8 OF THE CODE OF VMGINIA, at 234 (House
Document No. 14, November 17, 1976) [hereinafter cited' as H. Doc. No. 14].
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364 (Cum. Supp. 1978). This section was enacted as part of
Virginia's new civil procedure act, TrrLE 8.01, becoming effective October 1, 1977 with the
repeal of TrrL9 8, including the early ancillary statutory interpleader at law remedy. See also
note 12 supra.
20. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-364 (Repl. Vol. 1977)(Reviser's note).
21. See H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 236. But cf. Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72
S.E. 695 (1911) (the court's holding that the early ancillary interpleader statute was merely
supplemental to and did not enlarge or limit the equitable remedy does not apply to the
current statute). See also VA. Sup. CT. R. 2:20. This rule has been added to implement section
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
This statute is patterned after the federal interpleader provisions found
in 28 U.S.C. §13352 and in Rule 222 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.24 It is frequently stated that these provisions provide for the broadest
and most liberal means of obtaining interpleader to be found today. 2 Most
authorities agree that they abolish all of the technical requirements of
equitable interpleader. 28
Since the enactment of the new interpleader provision, it has not been
8.01-364, and "should not be interpreted as adding to the statute the restrictions of the
traditional equity suit for interpleader which the statute itself does not require." VA. CODE
ANN. §8.01-364 (Repl. Vol. 1977)(Reviser's note).
22. The federal statutory interpleader (28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970) [hereinafter cited as §
1335] reads as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, irm, or corporation,
association, or society having in his or its custody or possession money or property of
the value of $500 or more, or having issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance,
or other instrument of value or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery
or payment or the loan of money or property of such amount or value, or being under
any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if
(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332
of this title, are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money or property, or to
any one or more of the benefits arising by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy
or other instrument, or arising by virtue of any such obligation; and if
(2) the plaintiff has deposited such money or property or has paid the amount of or
the loan or other value of such instrument or the amount due under such obligation
into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, or has given
bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with such surety as the court
or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance by the plaintiff with the
future order or judgment of the court with respect to the subject matter of the contro-
versy.
(b) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the conflicting
claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to and
independent of one another.
23. The federal rule interpleader (FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (1)) [hereinafter cited as Rule 22(1)]
reads as follows:
(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to joinder that
the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not
have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one
another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or
all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such inter-
pleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement
and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
24. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 235.
25. 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.04[1], at 22-14; Beckman supra note 7.
26. See 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.11; 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1704, at 368-69 (1972).
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interpreted in any Virginia case. In light of this fact, and because the
statute has borrowed heavily from the federal interpleader provisions, it is
the purpose of this article to compare and contrast the Virginia statute
with the federal provisions when it is appropriate; to flesh out the statute
with federal case law where it is necessary; and to discuss any ambiguities
and inconsistencies found within the interpleader section.
11. WHEN INTERPLEADER IS APPROPRIATE
In determining when interpleader is appropriate under the Virginia stat-
ute, it might be helpful first to consider the general purposes of inter-
pleader as they have come to be viewed in the federal courts. Though its
purposes are varied, interpleader primarily prevents the stakeholder from
having to determine at his peril which claimant has the better claim to the
stake," and if the stakeholder is disinterested in the outcome, it forces the
claimants to litigate the merits of their claims without embroiling the
stakeholder in the controversy.23 However, even if the stakeholder is inter-
ested in the outcome of the case, it prevents the threat of multiple liability
arising because of inconsistent determinations in different courts. 2 The
federal courts also have expanded this notion of a fear of exposure to
multiple liability to include the situation where the stakeholder has only
a limited fund or property, and thus, he is able to use interpleader to
protect himself from the vexation of multiple suits.2
But interpleader does not only benefit the stakeholder, it also benefits
the judicial system and the claimants. It benefits the judicial system by
consolidating several potential individual actions into a single comprehen-
sive suit thereby saving court time and expense, as well as providing for
consistency of results. 1 The claimants are benefited by being able to bring
all their claims in one action and having the court equitably divide a
limited fund. This prevents the unfairness of a race to judgment by the
claimants only to find that the first claimant there has exhausted the fund.
A. Persons Entitled to Interplead
Subsection A of the Virginia interpleader statute enables "any person,"
either as plaintiff or as defendant, to interplead claimants whose adverse
27. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953).
28. Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 141 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
739 (1937).
29. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
30. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
31. 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 26, § 1702, at 364.
32. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
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claims to the property may subject him to multiple liability.3 The statute
has expanded the availability of interpleader by wisely abrogating the
requirement of the prior statute34 that limited the remedy to defendants
until they had submitted affidavits that they had not colluded with any
of the claimants. While both plaintiffs and defendants may now inter-
plead, they may do so even if they are interested stakeholders. Subsection
A expressly abolishes the equitable requirement that the stakeholder be
disinterested in the outcome of the case by stating: "['at is not ground
for objection . . . that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or
in part to any or all of the claimants."" Although the current statute has
abolished two major limitations on interpleader, it does require that for a
person to interplead, the property or fund must be held "by him or on his
behalf, '3 and that he must be willing to "pay or tender" it. into the court. 3
B. Primary Test
Under Subsection A of the Virginia interpleader statute, the primary
test for determining the propriety of interpleading the adverse claimants
33. Subsection A is very similar to Rule 22(1), supra note 23, in its language and in its
intent of extending interpleader to plaintiffs and defendants. The only significant changes
found in subsection A are the substitution of "any person" for "plaintiff," and the deletion
of the reference to defendant's crossclaim or counterclaim because they are intended to be
included within the term "pleading" in the first sentence of subsection A. H. Doc. No. 14,
supra note 18, at 235.
34. See note 12 supra.
35. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 235. This is the precise language found in Rule 22(1),
supra note 23. Although such language is absent from section 1335, supra note 22, the federal
courts have successfully read it into the statutory provision. This result has been achieved,
in part, because the statutory interpleader specifically applies to actions of interpleader or
in the nature of interpleader, and also because there is no longer any practical reason to
distinguish the two actions. See Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.
1939); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938); 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.07
[11; Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940). See also
note 8 supra. Although the Virginia statute does not expressly embrace both strict inter-
pleader and bills in the nature of interpleader, as does § 1335, supra note 22, all distinctions
between the two remedies should be laid to rest since the statute, like Rule 22(1), supra note
23, expressly avails itself to interested stakeholders. And it should be a sufficient equitable
basis for interpleader under the statute if the stakeholder is threatened by exposure to multi-
ple vexation, whether he is disinterested or not. See note 8 supra.
36. This requirement is borrowed from § 1335, supra note 22, which requires that the person
filing the interpleader action must have "custody and possession." Oddly enough, the early
Virginia statute, supra note 12, did not make such a requirement.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364(D) (1978 Supp). See generally notes 94-95 infra, for a discus-
sion of the deposit requirement in Virginia; see also Scott v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 48 F.R.D.
446 (W.D. Va. 1969).
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(the so-called "first stage" of interpleader-) is whether the applicant "...
is or may be exposed to multiple liability through the existence of claims
by others to the same property or fund. .. ."I In this initial-phase of the
action, the only appropriate requirement is that there be a good faith fear
of exposure to double liability, and it should be irrelevant whether the
applicant believes all the claims against the fund are meritorious."° Indeed,
only one claimant will ultimately succeed to the fund. Nonetheless, the
utility of making interpleader available should not be diminished so long
as the stakeholder's bona fide purpose is to avoid the expense and potential
vexation of litigating conflicting claims.4'
To understand when the primary test for granting interpleader has been
statisfied, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the concepts, "exposed
to multiple liability" and "same property or fund," as they are used in
subsection A.
It is the exposure to multiple liability (or "double liability" as it is often
referred to) that has been the traditional equitable grounds upon which an
interpleader action will lie.42 It exists when several adverse parties are
asserting mutually exclusive claims to a single outstanding obligation
which might result in inconsistent adverse determinations in different
courts. 3 But not everyone faced with the threat of a multiplicity of suits
is entitled to interplead; if there is more than a single obligation owing, or
a double recovery is justified by law, then interpleader is not appropriate."
Simply stated and stripped of its technicalities, the primary test for deter-
38. Interpleader actions in the federal courts, for practical reasons, generally involve two
stages of litigation. The first stage is devoted to determining if the prerequisites for inter-
pleader have been met. If the court determines that the applicant has satisfied the primary
test and interpleader is available, then it will discharge the stakeholder if he is disinterested,
and order the adverse claimants to interplead. The so-called "second stage" involves the
actual litigation between the adverse claimants on the merits to determine who has the better
claim to the stake. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
99 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Pa. 1951), affl'd, 194 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
966 (1952). See generally 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.14 [1-2]; see also notes 89 and 95
infra, if stakeholder is interested, or may be independently liable.
39. Cf. § 1335, supra note 22, and Rule 22, supra note 23, for similarities in statement of
primary test.
40. Bierman v. Marcus, 246 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied sub nom., Milmar Estate,
Inc. v. Marcus, 356 U.S. 933 (1958); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952
(2d Cir. 1953).
41. Id.
42. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp.
474 (E.D. La. 1960).
43. Id. See generally 3A MooRE, supra note 8, 1 22.02 [1]; 7 WmaHT AMD MILm, supra
note 26, § 1704; Chafee, supra note 2.
44. Trowbridge v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 322 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Pan Am.
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960); Chafee, supra note 2, at 819.
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mining the propriety of granting the relief of interpleader is two-fold: first,
there must be only a single obligation owing;45 and second, the claims to
it must be mutually exclusive in the sense that "they necessarily overlap,"
such that "if one claim is right, the rest must be wrong.""6 An illustration
will make the concept clear:
For example, if A borrowed $10 from B and also bought a $10 book from C
on credit, he could not interplead them when they each came around to
collect their $10. He would owe more than a single obligation, and the estab-
lishment of his liability to one party would not necessarily defeat his liability
to the other. However, if A was holding a particular picture for B and B then
disappeared leaving behind C and D each of whom claimed that B owed the
picture to him, A could interplead C and D because a decision on the merits
in favor of one of the claimants would necessarily dictate a determination
that the other was not legally entitled to recovery of the picture from A.
4 7
The next consideration is what is meant by the concept "same property
or fund" as it is used in subsection A of the Virginia interpleader section.
Purportedly, the inclusion of this concept means that the old equitable
requirement of "identity of claims" 8 has been retained, and that this is
the major distinction between the Virginia section and the federal provi-
sions." If this is the case, then interpleader in Virginia will be denied
"unless the claims coincide at every point like two superimposed triangles
in plane geometry."5 In its strictest terms, it will require that the claims
must not deviate in the amount sought, the form of action, or the relief
requested." Even at its best, the identity of claims rule is nothing more
than "an unsuccessful attempt to phrase the principle of mutual exclusive-
ness."52
Hence, it is very doubtful that the revisers intended to retain the require-
ment of identity of claims as that concept is traditionally used. Indeed,
such a requirement would be inconsistent with the reviser's intent to create
45. Id.
46. Chafee, supra note 2, at 818-19 (concept was originated by Professor Chafee); accord,
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164 (D.V.I. 1975); Trowbridge v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 322 F. Supp.
190 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960);
3A MOORE, supra note 8, 1 22.02 [1], at 22-8.
47. Trowbridge v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 322 F. Supp. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For
another example, see Chafee, supra note 2, at 819.
48. See generally Chafee, supra note 2, at 823-28; Hazard and Moskovitz, supra note 3, at
724-35.
49. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 16, at 235; 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 245, 264-65 (1977).
50. Chafee, supra note 2, at 824.
51. Chafee, supra note 2, at 823-28.
52. Id., at 824.
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"a modem interpleader practice . . extended on practical grounds far
beyond the traditional remedy in equity and the early ancillary statutory
interpleader at law. '53 A further indication of the reviser's intent is their
explanation of the so-called "identity of claims" concept in the Virginia
statute as follows:
... while claims need not have a common origin and can be founded on
different theories of recovery (i.e., one in contract, another in tort), such
claims must relate to or affect the same property or fund."
This explanation clearly does not coincide with that of the early equity
courts." Furthermore, the requirement of identity of claims is inconsistent
with the face of the Virginia interpleader statute which expressly abolishes
the requirement as follows:
It is not ground for objection to joinder that the claims of the several claim-
ants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a common origin
or are not identical. . . (emphasis added)
Thus, the requirement that there be identity of claims as a prerequisite
for interpleader under the new statute is inconsistent with the reviser's
intent; it is inconsistent with the language of the statute; and it is incon-
sistent with the modem trend from which the statute was patterned. To
clear up these inconsistencies, the statute should be read as abolishing the
identity of claims rule. And the concept "same property or fund," included
therein, should be read merely as facilitating an understanding of when
interpleader is appropriate under the primary test, that is, mutually exclu-
sive claims must be directed against the same property or fund.7
With an understanding of the primary test to be used in determining
whether interpleader should be granted, it is important now to consider
whether that test is expansive enough to include the situation where the
threat is exposure to "multiple vexation" rather than multiple liability. 8
In theory, the two are not the same. The former involves claims which are
not mutually exclusive in the sense that if one claim is right, the rest are
53. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 234.
54. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 235.
55. See notes 50 and 51 supra.
56. This is the precise language found in Rule 22(1), supra note 23, and is similar to that
found in § 1335(b), supra note 22. And it is the presence of this language in the federal
provisions which abolish the first two of Pomeroy's equitable requirements for interpleader,
identity of claims and common origin. 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.11, at 22-101; Chafee,
Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377, 408 (1940).
57. For cases in which interpleader was allowed under federal provisions, although identity
of claims was absent, see 3A MooRE, supra note 8, 22.11, at 22-103, n.8.
58. See generally 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.08 [1], at 22-52, to 22-58; 7 WRIGHT AND
MILLER, supra note 26, § 1705, at 377-81.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
wrong,59 potentially all the claims are valid. But the claims asserted, in the
aggregate, are greater than the limited fund held by the stakeholder0 For
this reason, interpleader has been allowed in the so-called "pie-slicing"
cases,6 not to protect the stakeholder from multiple liability, but to pro-
tect him from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation, and to
prevent a disproportionate "slicing" of the fund by one claimant ahead of
the rest.2 The revisers of the Virginia interpleader section seemed to have
had the "pie-slicing" situation in mind when they stated the purpose of
interpleader, in part, as the ". . . avoidance of the vexation of multiple
claims to disputed property and of possible multiple liability arising from
those claims .... "63 Though the statute does not expressly embrace the
threat of multiple vexation in its test for determining whether interpleader
is appropriate, there is no apparent reason why it does not do so by impli-
cation. The federal provisions, likewise, do not include any mention of
multiple vexation. But federal courts have had little trouble realizing the
practical utility interpleader has of assuring an equitable distribution of a
fund in a single proceeding when several similarly situated claimants have
a right to it, in whole or in part. 4 Principles of judicial economy support
this position; judicial reasoning would seem to dictate it. A stakeholder
who seeks a fair apportionment of his limited stake should not be turned
away at the courthouse door because there is no such relief available. In
this instance, interpleader is a sufficient and practical remedy; its benefits
clearly justify its application.65 If the case arises, Virginia should follow the
59. The stakeholder will also not run the risk of paying a single debt twice, for he is
acquitted after the first payment of a judgment. 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 26, § 1705
at 377.
60. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); American Fidelity Fire
Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164 (D.V.I. 1975).
61. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164, 173
(D.V.I. 1975). "The typical examples are interpleader by the surety on a payment bond being
subjected to claims by a string of subcontractors or materialmen, and interpleader by a
liability insurer being subjected to claims of persons injured by the insured." 3A MooRE,
supra note 8, 22.02 [1], at 22-9 (footnote omitted).
62. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Underwriters at Lloyd's v.
Nichols, 363 F. 2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966); Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F. 2d 578 (8th
Cir. 1939); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. A. S. Reid & Co., 16 F. 2d 502 (E.D. Pa. 1926); American
Fideltiy Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164 (D V.I. 1975); Pan Am
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
63. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 236.
64. The federal courts have relied heavily on their interpretation of the requirement of
"adversity" (see note 75 infra), and on the fact that federal statutory and rule interpleader
are prospective in nature (see note 78 infra).
65. Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (pt. 2), 45 YALE L. J. 1161, 1166 (1936);
Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377, 417-21 (1940); Hazard
and Moskovitz, supra note 3, at 759.
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trend in the federal courts of expanding the traditional role of interpleader
to protect the applicant from vexatious litigation, as well as from multiple
liability.
C. Adverse and Prospective Claims
Subsection A of the Virginia statute expressly requires, as a prerequisite
of interpleader, that the claims be "adverse to and independent of one
another."'" But the requirement of adversity is nothing more than an indi-
rect way of requiring that claims be mutually exclusive." Furthermore, by
the very nature of interpleader, adversity of claims would be required even
without mention in the statute, otherwise, there would be no justifiable
reason to protect either the stakeholder or the claimants.6
Claims, however, are not adverse if there is more than a single obligation
owing, 7 or the claims are asserted against different funds or property, 0 or
the stakeholder does not have a bona fide fear of multiple liability.7 But
if claims are adverse, it is not ground for objection to interpleader that they
are not derived from a common source. This is because subsection A ex-
pressly abolished the equity requirement of privity of claims.72 The advan-
tage of this welcomed improvement over the equitable remedy and the
prior statute is that claims do not have to be dependent upon or derived
from a common origin so long as they are adverse.7" Interpleader also
should not be denied for a lack of adversity in cases involving multiple
vexation. Admittedly, the claimants would be indifferent toward each
other, and their claims would not be adverse in the traditional sense of
asserting mutually exclusive claims.7 But because the claimants would be
fighting over a fund insufficient to satisfy all of them, the requisite adver-
sity can be found in each claimant's interest in reducing or defeating the
claims of every other claimant.75 By the same token, if the aggregate of the
66. This adversity provision is taken directly from Rule 22(1), supra note 23, and §
1335(a)(1), supra note 22.
67. See Gaines v. Sunray Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1976); 3A MooRE, supra note 8,
22.08 [11, at 22-53; 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 26, § 1705, at 373.
68. 7 WRIGHT AND MILM, supra note 26, § 1705, at 373, n. 72.
69. Trowbridge v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 322 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
70. Id.
71. See note 38 supra.
72. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 235; cf. Nicholas v. Harrisonburg Bldg. & Supply
Co., 181 Va. 207, 21 S.E. 2d 452 (1943); Bell Storage Co. v. Harrison, 164 Va. 278, 180 S.E.
320 (1935); Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
73. For a thorough discussion of the rather nebulous requirement of common origin, see
Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 Yms L. J. 814, 828-40 (1921); Hazard and Moskovitz,
supra note 3, at 724-35.
74. See Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
75. After a series of well reasoned cases, this seems to be the settled opinion of the federal
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claims does not exceed the limited fund, then interpleader should properly
be denied for lack of adversity."
An important inclusion in the Virginia interpleader section is the provi-
sion that interpleader is allowed "whenever any person is or may be ex-
posed to multiple liability."77 This acceleration clause makes it clear that
an interpleader action should be permitted whether the claims vexing the
stakeholder are actual or only prospective. Hence, it is inappropriate to
deny interpleader where the claims have not yet been assefted or reduced
to judgment so long as the primary test of mutual exclusiveness is met.,
D. Independent Liability Permitted
The interpleader statute does not expressly abolish the fourth equitable
requirement, that of no independent liability. Consequently, the status of
courts. See Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414 (1937); Underwriters at Lloyd's v.
Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966); Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F.2d 578 (8th
Cir. 1939); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. A. S. Reid & Co., 16 F.2d 502 (E.D. Pa. 1926); Commer-
cial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960). The court in Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams
summarized the opinion of the federal courts with this graphic illustration:
Finally, it has been urged that the action is not proper because the claimants do not
have claims adverse to each other. It might, by the same reasoning, be said that 100
persons adrift in the ocean with but one small lifeboat in sight were not adverse to each
other. We fear, however, that the concept of non-adversity would dwindle in direct
proportion to the number of swimmers reaching the boat.***In a situation where the
aggregate of the claims is far in excess of the liability of the insurer, each claimant is
interested in reducing or defeating the claim of every other claimant, and the adversity
of claim required by statute is satisfied. *** Further, interpleader may be resorted to
by an insurance carrier when the adverse claims are unliquidated tort claims against
its assured.
231 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
76. See Fulton v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 397 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1968); Joseph F. Hughes &
Co. v. Harry S. Mickey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1962).
77. The acceleration clause in Rule 22(1), supra note 23, is identical to the one in VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-364(A) (Cum. Supp. 1978); similarly, § 1335, supra note 22, provides for pros-
pective claims by the words "are claiming or may claim." For a discussion of the acceleration
clauses in the federal provisions, and their interpretation by the federal courts, see 3A MooRE,
supra note 8, $ 22.08 [2]; 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 26, § 1707.
78. In Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 480 (E.D. La. 1960), Judge
Skelly Wright, when faced with the problem of whether the requirement of "exposure to
multiple liability" in Rule 22 was expansive enough to encompass the "fear of multiple
vexation," said: "The key to the clause requiring exposure to 'double or multiple liability' is
in the words 'may be.' The danger need not be immediate; any possibility of having to pay
more than is justly due, no matter how improbable or remote, will suffice. At least, it is settled
that an insurer with limited contractural liability who faces claims in excess of his policy
limits is 'exposed' within the intendment of Rule 22, and we need go no further to find the
requirement satisfied." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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this requirement is uncertain." Before determining whether independent
liability is permitted under the present statute, it is necessary to under-
stand when independent liability occurs, and the reasons for the rule pro-
hibiting it in interpleader actions. Independent liability may be incurred
in two ways:"0 first, where an agent, or bailee or some other party seeking
interpleader, has, in his dealings with one of the claimants, expressly ac-
knowledged the latter's title, or has contractually bound himself to the
claimant, such that he is liable on the undertaking independent of the
interpleader action. In the second way, the independent liability arises out
of the very nature of the relationship between the stakeholder and one of
the claimants, without reference to an acknowledgment of title or contrac-
tual arrangement.
The justifications for the requirement can be broken down into two basic
categories. There are those cases which state that the no independent
liability rule is a necessary corollary to the requirements of privity and
disinterestedness."' If the stakeholder were independently liable to one
claimant, the claims were not derived from a common source; also, the
stakeholder could not be indifferent, for a recovery by the claimant to
whom he was not independently liable would expose him to a double loss.
The other category of cases based their justification for the rule on "relics
of an antiquated procedure imposing unnecessary restrictions upon joinder
of parties and claims and upon the trial of separate issues."' 2
The recent trend, however, has been towards rejecting the no indepen-
dent liability restriction, and allowing interpleader if there is a bona fide
threat of mutually exclusive claims, apart from any independent claims
against the stakeholder. The reason for this trend is that the two basic
justifications for the restrictions no longer exist. On the one hand, the
79. The federal provisions, from which VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364 (Cum. Supp. 1978) is
patterned, do not expressly abolish the no independent liability requirement. This caused
some problem in th federal courts, but it now seems to be uniformly resolved in favor of the
rule's rejection. See generally 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.11, at 22-105; 7 WMGHT AND
MILLER, supra note 26, § 1706, at 381.
80. Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911) (citing 4 POMEROY'S EQUrrY JuRIS-
PRUDENCE § 1326 (5th ed. 1941)).
81. Three Virginia cases cited this as the justification for the requirement: Nicholas v.
Harrisonburg Bldg. & Supply Co., 181 Va. 207, 21 S.E. 2d 452 (1943)(early ancillary statutory
interpleader at law); Bell Storage Co. v. Harrison, 164 Va. 278, 180 S.E. 320 (1935) (equitable
interpleader); Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911) (equitable interpleader).
82. 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.11 at 22-107. See also Note, The Independent Liability
Rule as a Bar to Interpleader in the Federal Courts, 65 YALE L. J. 715 (1956).
83. See Dakota Livestock Co. v. Keim, 552 F. 2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1977); Hebel v. Ebersole,
543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1976); Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F. 2d 425 (10th Cir. 1966);
Olivier v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 225 F. Supp. 536 (E. D. La 1963).
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federal provisions have expressly abolished the requirements of privity of
claims and of disinterestedness of the stakeholder."4 And on the other hand,
"[c]ontemporary procedure, with its flexible provisions for wide joinder
of parties and claims, [and] for separate trial of separate issues where
necessary, . . . is well adapted to disposing of interpleader cases where
independent liability is asserted.""
The revisers of the Virginia interpleader statute have endorsed this re-
cent trend with the statement that "the reasons underlying the inter-
pleader remedy. . . continue to have merit when the person interpleading
may be liable to one of the claimants on an independent basis."8 In addi-
tion to the intent of the revisers, the reason for the trend in the federal
courts towards vitiation of the restriction is directly applicable to Virginia.
The current statute abolishes both the requirements of privity and disin-
terestedness,"7 and Virginia civil procedure provides for the same liberal
joinder and severance of parties and claims.
The only question remaining is how should an interpleader trial be con-
ducted when an independent claim is involved. While there is no definitive
answer to this question, some commentators suggest that the second stage
of the interpleader action is appropriate for litagating both the adverse
claims and the independent claim."8 The claims would be consolidated and
tried in a single proceeding, thus promoting judicial economy. In a particu-
lar case, however, a better approach may be to try the independent claim,
if necessary, in a third stage. 9 This would be especially true if the indepen-
84. Professor Chafee, a key figure in drafting the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, stated
that, although the Act did not mention the independent liability requirement, "it was hoped
that the statutory abolition of privity would also dispose of this other rigid requirement."
Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since The Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377, 412 (1940).
85. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 74, at 364 (3rd ed. 1976). See also Note, The
Independent Liability Rule as a Bar to Interpleader in the Federal Courts, 65 YALE L. J. 715
(1956).
86. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 236.
87. See notes 35 and 72 supra.
88. See 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.1413], at 22-130; 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER supra note
26, § 1714, at 443; Note, The Independent Liability Rule as a Bar tc Interpleader in the
Federal Courts, 65 YALE L. J. 715, 720-22 (1956).
89. "Determination would be made at the second stage, as is usual, of the respective claims
to title by the various claimants. If the claimant asserting the independent liability prevails
at the second stage, there would be no need for a third, since he could not recover twice. If,
however, some other claimant is awarded title to the fund after a trial at the second stage,
the stakeholder in the third stage would confront the claimant asserting the independent
liability." 3A MOORE, supra note 8, 22.14[3], at 22-131. The three-stage approach was
originated by Professor Chafee in Chafee, supra note 2, at 843. For cases in which it has been
applied, see Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1976); Royal School Lab., Inc. v. Town
of Watertown, 358 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1966).
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dent claim and the interpleader claims are not closely related. But if there
is a "strong nexus" between the claims, the court has the discretion to try
the claims together in the second stage, or to tailor the sequence of the trial
to meet the particular needs of the case. 0
In short, there is no one way to conduct an interpleader trial involving
an independent claim. The revisers recognized this and concluded that the
trial court should have full discretion in tailoring the course of the inter-
pleader action so as to fairly accommodate the claim of independent liabil-
ity.9 1
I. RESTRAINING ORDER, DEPOSIT IN COURT, OTHER PROVISIONS
One of the major advantages of the interpleader remedy is that it substi-
tutes "one comprehensive litigation for an extended series of individual
actions.""2 By doing so, the remedy promotes judicial economy and consist-
ency of results. This advantage, of course, is possible only if the court has
the power to settle all claims in a single proceeding, and to enjoin claim-
ants from bringing separate actions in other courts. Subsection C of the
Virginia statute makes it explicit that the courts have the power in an
interpleader action to restrain all further proceedings in any court of the
state affecting the property or fund involved in the interpleader action.1
3
It is, however, entirely within the discretion of the court to grant or deny
injunctive relief,94 and the court may make the injunction permanent if
necessary. Under the second paragraph of Subsection C, the court also has
the discretion to discharge a disinterested stakeholder from any further
liability, and to make all necessary orders to enforce its judgment. 5
Subsection D of the interpleader section affords the stakeholder the right
to voluntarily deposit the disputed property or fund into the court, or he
may be ordered to do so by the court. In the typical case, the court may
90. 7 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 24, § 1714, at 441.
91. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 236. As a sort of guideline, the revisers suggest that
"upon review of the facts and the pleadings, the court may choose to (1) dismiss the claim,
(2) order severance or separate trials, or (3) require that the independent claim to the dis-
puted property be tried in the interpleader action." Id.
92. Id.
93. Subsection C is patterned after 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1970), which grants the federal courts
the power to restrain claimants from instituting other actions in state or federal courts in
connection with the federal statutory interpleader remedy found in §1335, supra.note 22; cf.
VA. CODE ANN. §8-226, supra note 12.
94. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 236.
95. Subsection C gives the court the discretionary power to tailor the course of the inter-
pleader action to meet the needs of the case, for example, where claims of an interested
stakeholder is involved, or claims of independent liability of stakeholder are asserted. See id.
96. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-364(D) (Cum. Supp 1978), by making the deposit optional, strikes
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find it beneficial to order the deposit of the property as "EL means of safe-
guarding the property and of facilitating the execution of its judgment.""7
If a disinterested stakeholder is involved, he will find it to his advantage
to make the voluntary deposit into the court so that he may be discharged
under Subsection D from all or part of any further liability.9 8 On the other
hand, if an interested stakeholder is involved and the court determines
that a deposit is necessary, he should be required to make a deposit equal
to the largest claim.99
Subsection B of the statute was included to make it clear that, although
the new interpleader remedy would replace the early ancillary statutory
interpleader at law and would displace the equitable remedy, the statute
was merely supplemental to and did not supersede or limit other remedies
provided for in the Virginia Code. The revisers had in mind'"0 those sec-
tions following the interpleader remedy dealing with claims of third parties
to property distrained or levied on,'"' and also a provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code which affords interpleader to a bailee of goods. 0 2 And
finally, the last sentence of subsection A was inserted to make it explicit
that the interpleader section was only supplemental to and did not limit
the joinder of parties provisions in the Virginia Code.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
The new interpleader statute should be welcomed by the Virginia Bar.
In an appropriate case, it will save the stakeholder the expense and hard-
ship of multiple liability and the vexation of multiple litigation; it will save
court time and expense while providing for consistency of results; and if a
limited fund is involved, it will benefit the claimants by permitting a fair
distribution of the fund. These benefits are possible because the current
statute has extended interpleader practice far beyond the equitable rem-
a balance between §1335(A)(2) and Rule 22(1). Under section 1335(A)(2), deposit of property
into court is a condition precedent to obtaining jurisdiction of court. Rule 22(1) makes no
requirement of deposit. However, a disinterested stakeholder can make a deposit into the
court under FED. R. Civ. P. 67, and then will be discharged from further liability. See 3A
MOORE, supra note 8, 9 22.10; cf. VA. CODE ANN. §8-226, supra note 12.
97. H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 237. Also, "a deposit is necessary to terminate a
previously existing obligation to pay interest." Id.; see Frumer, On Revising the New York
Interpleader Statutes, 25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 737, 768-770 (1950).
98. The 1978 amendment inserted "from all or part of any liability as" at the end of VA.
CODE ANN. §8.01-364(D) (Cum. Supp. 1978) to make this point clear.
99. See United Artists Corp. v. Fields Prod., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
National Sur. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 331 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
100. See H. Doc. No. 14, supra note 18, at 236.
101. See VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-365 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
102. See VA. CODE ANN. §8.7-603 (added Vol. 1965).
103. See VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-5 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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edy and the early ancillary statutory interpleader at law. The remedy is
available to both plaintiffs and defendants whether they are disinterested
or not, and regardless of whether their claims are derived from a common
source. However, the requirement that the claims must be directed toward
the same property or fund should not be interpreted as a retention of the
equitable requirement of identity of claims. Rather, it merely emphasizes
that interpleader is permitted only when the stakeholder is exposed to
multiple liability in respect to a single outstanding obligation. The test for
determining whether the applicant is exposed to multiple liability, simply
stated, is this: are the claims, which are asserted against a single obligation
owing, mutually exclusive in the sense that they necessarily overlap? They
overlap when the validity of one claim hinges on the invalidity of all the
rest. This test should be liberally construed to include the threat of multi-
ple vexation towards a limited fund where the necessary adversity between
the claims is supplied by the efforts of each claimant to defeat or reduce
the claims of every other claimant. If the claims are mutually exclusive,
relief should not be denied because they are only prospective in nature.
Finally, although the statute does not expressly abolish the fourth of the
equity requirements, that of no independent liability, there is no good
reason to deny relief just because a claim of independent liability of the
stakeholder is asserted in the suit.
Stephen E. Baril
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